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To cite this article: Friederike Trotier (2017): The Legacy of the Games of the New Emerging Forces and Indonesia's Relationship with the International Olympic Committee, The International Journal of the History of Sport, DOI: [10.1080/09523367.2017.1281801](https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2017.1281801)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2017.1281801>



Published online: 22 Feb 2017.



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The Legacy of the Games of the New Emerging Forces and Indonesia's Relationship with the International Olympic Committee

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ABSTRACT

The Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) often serve as an example of the entanglement of sport, Cold War politics and the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s. Indonesia as the initiator plays a salient role in the research on this challenge for the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The legacy of GANEFO and Indonesia's further relationship with the IOC, however, has not yet drawn proper academic attention. This paper analyzes Indonesia's interactions with the IOC until the present time, with a focus on the country's involvement in sporting events under the patronage of the IOC (such as the Asian and Southeast Asian Games). In addition, two case studies demonstrate the variable relationship between the two actors. First, Indonesia only narrowly escaped sanctions over a dispute on the use of the Olympic logo in 2015. Yet, the country is named as host of the 2018 Asian Games, hence showing high ambitions to re-enter the international sports arena. These incidents illustrate the significance of conformity of local agencies towards the IOC with regard to political positions and power structures. The study opens the field to local – Asian – perspectives on interactions with the IOC.

KEYWORDS

Indonesia; GANEFO; Asian games; Southeast Asian games; International Olympic Committee (IOC)

Introduction

Indonesia – although the largest South-East Asian country – does not have a reputation as a sporting nation and has therefore received little attention during international sporting events such as the Olympic Games. Yet, one episode makes Indonesia prominent in the history of the Olympic Movement. The country created a counter platform for sporting events, challenging the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The so-called Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) often serve as an example of the entanglement of sport, Cold War politics and the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s. The research on this conflict between the 'Old Established Forces' and the 'New Emerging Forces' – using President Sukarno's words – has shed light on Indonesia's role.¹ However, the legacy of this politically motivated sporting event for the host country, as well as for Indonesia's further relationship with the Olympic Movement have so far drawn little attention.

Starting with a summary of GANEFO, its challenge of the IOC and the role of Indonesia, this paper analyzes Indonesia's further relationship with the IOC until the present with the focus on the country's involvement in sporting events under the patronage of the IOC, concentrating on the Asian Games and the Southeast Asian Games. The focus lies on the first Southeast Asian Games with Indonesian participation in 1979. The changes within the structure of Indonesian sports bodies reflect the specific domestic policies, as well as the modality of interaction with other Indonesian and international sports organizations. In addition, two cases demonstrate the variable relationship between Indonesia and the IOC, including the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA). On the one hand, Indonesia only narrowly escaped sanctions over a dispute regarding the use of the Olympic logo in 2015. On the other hand, the country was named host of the forthcoming Eighteenth Asian Games in 2018 and thus showing high ambitions to re-enter the international sport stage. These incidents illustrate the significance of conformity of local agencies towards the IOC with regard to political positions and power structures. Yet, depending on the circumstances, the member state can exert pressure on the international committee as well. Focusing on Indonesia, the study attempts to open the field to local – Asian – perspectives on interactions with the Olympic Movement.

GANEFO and the IOC

WE PEOPLES OF THE NEW EMERGING FORCES

conscious that sports mean to serve as an instrument to build Man and Nations, to create international understanding and goodwill, **desirous** to build this world anew, free from colonialism and imperialism in all their forms and manifestations,

aspiring to develop a community of nations imbued with the spirit of the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung 1955 which ensures respect for each other's national identity and national sovereignty [*sic*], strengthens friendship, fosters cooperation towards lasting peace among nations, and towards Brotherhood of Man,

have agreed to develop a new international sports movement, to secure the achievement of these ideals,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

resolve, through our representatives assembled in conference in the capital city of Djakarta, Indonesia, from 27th till 29th April 1963, to adopt the following Charter, and to proclaim an international sports movement:

THE GAMES OF THE NEW EMERGING FORCES

To be known as the

GANEFO²

In the era of the Cold War, the newly independent or decolonizing countries attempted to find their place in the world and to establish a force outside of the East–West confrontation. This situation brought forth the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement to offer a platform for these new international players. Following the concept of the 'Third World' – in contrast to the Western and Eastern Bloc, respectively, the 'First and Second World' – their policy was

also coined *Third Worldist* policy. One of the main actors of this Third Worldist policy was the Indonesian President Sukarno, who had proclaimed Indonesian independence in 1945 and led the country until his removal from office in 1967. He was highly ambitious about his own role and the role of his country in the Non-Aligned Movement, creating his own political vision to gain a leading position. Sukarno saw two opponent groups struggling with each other: the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOs) and the New Emerging Forces (NEFOs). The Old Established Forces were the (former) colonial powers, including not only countries, but also institutions situated within the context of 'imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism'. In contrast, the New Emerging Forces constituted those countries and institutions and so on that had suffered from the oppression of the opponent group. His definition of forces created a new dimension beyond the nation state in order to address a larger part of the world, as, for example, parts of Africa were still in the process of decolonization. Furthermore, any kind of organization could thus be called a NEFO even if its geographical location was outside of the Third World.³

One strategy to fill his political vision of the competing forces with life was to create a platform for the NEFOs to meet and interact, yet not in a formal political context, but rather on the personal level, especially among young people. Hence, Sukarno founded the GANEFO and the event clearly bore his signature. In his perception, the newly established sporting event would strengthen his concept, as well as his own position. In 1963, the foundation of the GANEFO⁴ thus had a strong link to the political agenda of the Indonesian president and his worldview. Yet, there were also some other factors which influenced the creation of GANEFO: first, there was the confrontation between Indonesia and the IOC; second, the interest of the Republic of China in creating sport games outside of the IOC; and third, the political awakening of the decolonizing countries mainly in Asia and Africa.

The conflict between Indonesia and the IOC goes back to the politicization of the Fourth Asian Games, which took place in Jakarta in 1962. When Indonesia was awarded the Asian Games in 1958, several initiatives started to secure a successful hosting of the event. On the one hand, the idea of success included following the motto of the Asian Games 'Ever onward' by reaching greater cooperation and solidarity among the Asian nations, as well as by outscoring the Western countries and their organizations (like the IOC). On the other hand, the focus lay on the development of Indonesia into a leading country for the Non-Aligned Movement. To reach the targets, the *Dewan Asian Games Indonesia* (DAGI) was formed for the preparation of the Games as along with the *Komite Gerakan Olahraga* (KOGOR), which was to secure sporting success of Indonesian athletes. From the beginning, the political targets of the Sukarno administration corresponded only partly with the concepts of the Asian Games Federation (AGF). Although one major objective was to strengthen Asian unity, the intended scope of the Indonesian organizers went beyond the core region of Asia to include African countries, for instance.⁵ This rather unique perception was in line with Indonesia's foreign policy to establish the Asian Games as an event of the Non-Aligned Movement and thus support Sukarno's ideology and nation-building policy. In addition, the Fourth Asian Games became a political message of anti-Western sentiments and thus a new threat for the IOC, which was later enforced by the GANEFO.

As Lutan (2007) and Hübner (2012) have further analyzed, the Indonesian usage of the Asian Games for political messages and the deliberate mixing of sports and politics initiated a longer dispute between Indonesia and the IOC.⁶ Indonesia refused to issue visas to the participants and officials from Taiwan and Israel as attribution to the amicable foreign

relations with the Republic of China and the Arabic countries. This was a confrontational action against the IOC for two reasons. First, the IOC claimed to be an institution outside of political affairs warning its members of mixing sports and politics. The Indonesian leadership, in contrast, was very frank with the political statements and even proclaimed a necessity to mix sports with politics in order to reach political goals and to end the hypocrisy of the IOC. Second, the IOC could not entirely avoid positioning itself in political issues. Prior to the Fourth Asian Games, the Asian Games Federation (AGF) had attempted to keep a low profile with regard to the 'two Chinas' issue (Communist versus Nationalist China). Nevertheless, Taiwan was invited to participate at the 1954 and 1958 Asian Games as it was a member state of the AGF and Communist China was not.⁷ Thus, the IOC was not able to entirely avoid a political positioning, yet the members were obliged to follow the decisions of the IOC. Indonesia refused to obey and consequently broke with the rules of the AGF concerning the attitude towards China and Taiwan.

The Indonesian perspective on the conflict was that the IOC and the AGF acted as Old Established Forces showing 'imperialistic' and 'neo-colonial' characteristics. Furthermore, the Indonesian leadership claimed that the Asian Games did not truly reflect the 'Bandung spirit', relating to the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, an event with a very high symbolic value. This meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement is perceived as the 'first and clearest manifestation of Third Worldist politics in action'⁸. The notion of solidarity became the most salient sentiment of the conference and was reflected in the metaphor of the 'Bandung spirit'. Sukarno constantly referred to this spirit during the process of establishing and organizing GANEFO. It united two important elements: on the one hand, it stood for the symbolic moment of decolonization and, on the other hand, for the beginning of a new era of international politics with Asian and African countries forming new and powerful actors.⁹ The Sukarno administration saw the necessity to follow its own political ideas and to create GANEFO in reaction to the neglect of the IOC and the AGF to follow the 'Bandung spirit' and to include Third Worldist policy in their agendas. Hence, GANEFO evolved as a result of Indonesia's unsuccessful attempt to reshape the Asian Games as a tool for the Non-Aligned Movement and as a tool to propagate the solidarity of the new forces in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.¹⁰

The politicization of sport in Indonesia had a strong effect on the sport organizations in the country. Already in 1946, one year after the declaration of independence, the Indonesian Sports Association (*Persatuan Olahraga Republik Indonesia*, PORI) was founded with its base in Yogyakarta, a nationalist stronghold. PORI organized the newly established National Games (*Peran Olahraga Nasional* [PON]), which constituted a crucial tool for nation building in the young and not yet internationally recognized country.¹¹ The first PON took place in Surakarta in 1948 and aimed to create and demonstrate national unity. A further goal of the Indonesian government was to gain international recognition, and the participation at international sporting events such as the Olympic Games or the newly established Asian Games was perceived as a promising step to reach this target. After becoming a member of the United Nations in 1950, Indonesia participated in the First Asian Games in 1951 and prepared for the Olympic Games in 1952. In the year of the Olympic Games in Helsinki, the IOC welcomed Indonesia with the Indonesian Olympic Committee (at first *Komite Olimpiade Republik Indonesia*, KORI, later changing to *Komite Olimpiade Indonesia*, KOI) as a new member. In the 1950s, elite sport and competitions on both national and international levels became more widespread in Indonesia.¹²

In 1962, prior to the Asian Games, the Ministry of Sport (*Departemen Olahraga* [DEPORA]) was founded and headed by Minister Maladi, who later played a vital role in the conflict with the IOC, pushing sport as a tool for nation building. When Indonesia had to leave the IOC, the Indonesian Olympic Committee was disbanded. The following creation of GANEFO enforced the mixing of the spheres of politics and sport; and the newly created Sports Council of the Republic of Indonesia (*Dewan Olahraga Republik Indonesia* [DORI]) embodied this entanglement, as it was an arm of the government. The head of the Sports Council, for instance, was the Indonesian president. After its foundation in 1964, all prior existing sports organizations were integrated into the *Dewan Olahraga*. Its tasks had a wide range covering national and international activities, for instance, to organize and oversee all sporting activities in the country and on the international level, to construct and maintain facilities, to develop sporting industries and to conduct and support research on sports and sports medicine. In addition, the Ministry of Sport had to administer the preparations of the First GANEFO in Jakarta. Hence, the *Dewan Olahraga* monopolized great power in the sport sector and beyond with access to funds and forces and the backing of the government.¹³

The perspective of the IOC and the AGF in the conflict with Indonesia concentrated on the Indonesian violation of the Olympic ideals and the immanent rule to keep sport and politics separated. The discrimination against two member states called for a reaction. Although the opinions on the nature of punishment were diverse – ranging from renaming the Fourth Asian Games to excluding Indonesia from the IOC – the members agreed on the necessity to rebuke Indonesia for its ‘misbehaviour’. The Asian Games took place unhampered, yet the punishment occurred one year later with Indonesia’s exclusion from the Olympic Movement.¹⁴ The IOC stated that it would refuse reinstating Indonesia as long as the government did not declare its will to respect the Olympic rules.¹⁵ The fact that Indonesia decided to leave the Movement before the official expulsion only demonstrates the will of the Indonesian government to play an active rather than a passive role. Indonesia resigned officially from the IOC in February 1963, but continued its confrontation with the IOC as a perceived ‘tool of imperialism’ by creating GANEFO as a competing platform for international sporting competitions.¹⁶

In combining the call for quitting the IOC and establishing the GANEFO, Sukarno demonstrated determination, in his course to fight the IOC’s ‘constant discrimination especially against Asian-African and Latin American nations’,¹⁷ thus seeing Indonesia as a main victim of the Committee’s ‘imperialistic’ and ‘colonialist’ attitude. In a further step, he conjured up Indonesia’s strength and future greatness as an independent country that does not depend on the Olympic platform. Hence, the assurance of Indonesia not being ‘a nation of frogs and toads’¹⁸ had more significance than the exclusion from the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo. Consequently, the newly founded GANEFO Federation with Sukarno as ‘Founder and Honorary President’¹⁹ and the headquarters in Jakarta embodied the initiative of Indonesia and other emerging countries, but also a signal to the IOC about its falseness and failures.

Besides Indonesia, the other main initiator in the realization of GANEFO was the Republic of China, which demonstrated a similar confrontational attitude towards the IOC. The Chinese showed an immense interest in the project of GANEFO since they were not part of the IOC, but rather already in opposition with the entire Western and Communist World. The new sporting event embodied a promising opportunity for China to fight the IOC, as well as the United States, as their proclaimed enemies.²⁰ China’s full support of GANEFO

included political, organizational and financial concerns. China provided immense financial support and thus enabled the implementation of the First GANEFO and the participation of athletes and officials from many poor countries.²¹ Therefore, similar to the Indonesian situation, GANEFO provided an outstanding opportunity for Communist China to take the lead among the countries of the Third World. With diplomatic communication and sporting success, China gained centre stage during the sporting event in Jakarta and improved its international image considerably.²²

The implementation of the First Games of the New Emerging Games in Jakarta provided the Sukarno administration with the opportunity to realize the targets of the previous Asian Games. Thus, the event left behind the regional scope of the Asian Games and became a global project with a strong link to the Non-Aligned Movement. Furthermore, Jakarta could claim to be the first Asian host of a truly international sporting event, outscoring Japan as the host of the 1964 Olympic Games.²³ In addition, the event fostered a feeling of solidarity among the participants as well as a feeling of national pride in Indonesia. The host was able to convey a positive image of its culture, such as the value of *gotong royong* which literally means to share a burden and to be mutually cooperative. As a core value in Javanese community life,²⁴ it fitted well into the idea of solidarity among the NEFOs. Another Indonesian principle claimed by the GANEFO Federation was *musjawarah*, a system of consultation, mutual dialogue and decision-making based on consensus.²⁵ This principle further strengthened Indonesia's key role for the GANEFO.

Although scholars still discuss the actual threat of GANEFO, these Games nevertheless challenged the monopoly of the IOC. The Olympic Committee or its regional franchises, offered newly decolonized countries membership of the respective organization, but sometimes lacked the sincerity to pay attention to the needs and wishes of the new members. When GANEFO challenged the IOC, the organization did not try to increase its appeal, but rather threatened to exclude those countries labelled as NEFOs from the 1964 Olympic Games if they followed Indonesia and GANEFO.

Indonesia, with a strong grievance and an ambitious leader, aimed to break the hegemony of the IOC and to challenge the distinctively Western structure of the Olympic Movement. On the one hand, the official statements issued by the GANEFO Federation demonstrated a modest and non-confrontational attitude towards other sports organizations – including the Olympic Movement – with the intention to be attractive for a large range of countries and organizations.

Ganefo is the manifestation of the demand of our new world itself. As such it is the manifestation of progress and improvement ... It is logical then that the Ganefo can co-exist with all international sports organizations except those hostile to the ideals of Ganefo. The Ganefo movement, working on the basis of fraternal equality and mutual cooperation, practices tolerance in all its undertakings. Tolerance accompanied with a sense of respect for the customs, traditions and national policies of respective members.²⁶

On the other hand, Sukarno torpedoed this strategy when attacking the IOC as being a hypocrite. He accused the IOC of acting politically and of denying this fact, supporting his point of view with examples from the treatment of Communist China, Egypt and North Korea. Sukarno emphasized:

Now let's frankly say, *sports have something to do with politics*. Indonesia proposes now to mix sports with politics, and let us now establish the Games of the New Emerging Forces, the GANEFO ... against the Old Established Order.²⁷

Consequently, the GANEFO Federation had to struggle permanently to find a balance between open confrontation and aggression and a moderate course to avoid a deterrent effect for the Asian, African and Latin American countries. Furthermore, in spite of the confrontation, Indonesia still felt the appeal of the Olympic Games and wanted to be part of the 1964 Games in Tokyo. Yet, from the Indonesian perspective, the imperialist nature of the IOC forced the newly decolonized countries to form their own event with an agenda that was truly in accord to the Olympic spirit.

Indonesia from the First GANEFO to the Southeast Asian Games (SEA Games)

GANEFO depicted a tool of Sukarno's foreign policy in the 1960s. Yet, in spite of the large-scale struggle against imperialism, colonialism and capitalism, the policy of GANEFO also had a regional focus on South-East Asia. On the one hand, Sukarno exploited the First GANEFO in Jakarta for his anti-Malaysia propaganda, combining the slogan of the Games with his *konfrontasi* policy:²⁸ 'Sukseskan GANEFO Ganjang Malaysia' [Success to GANEFO Crush Malaysia].²⁹ Furthermore, the official motto of the Games, 'Onward! No Retreat!', served as the slogan of the confrontation with Malaysia even after the Games were over.³⁰ On the other hand, Indonesia used GANEFO to stress diplomatic relations with other countries in the region. As participants from Laos, Thailand, Burma and Cambodia took part in the Games, these countries were on rather positive or neutral terms with Indonesia. The closest cooperation existed between Indonesia and Cambodia. Although a detailed study on Cambodia's role in the GANEFO movement has yet to be undertaken, there are several indications to assume that the country had a strong interest in the Third Worldist Movement and in supporting GANEFO. When Cambodia cancelled the regional event of the Southeast Asian Peninsular Games in 1963, the declared reason was not the continuous disputes with Thailand but rather a statement of solidarity with Indonesia against the IOC.³¹ Furthermore, Cambodia agreed on hosting the First Asian GANEFO in 1966.³² It is likely that Indonesia and Cambodia worked closely together to successfully implement the Asian GANEFO in Phnom Penh and that is why they were the driving forces of the first regional GANEFO.

Indonesia's confrontation policy against the IOC ended with the country's political turnover, General Suharto's seizure of power, and one of the darkest chapters of Indonesian history with the killings of hundreds of alleged communists. Suharto, as the new president, followed a political agenda contrary to Sukarno's. GANEFO, as a manifestation of Sukarno's rapprochement to communist China, contrasted Suharto's anti-communist policy and was therefore excluded from the national memory in the anti-communist New Order regime. One example of the complete political turn from Sukarno to Suharto was Indonesia's position in the AGF with regard to the 'Two Chinas' question. In 1962, Indonesia had prevented Taiwan from participating at the Asian Games and was therefore severely punished. About 10 years later, in 1973, Indonesia voted for Taiwan to remain a member of the Federation, but the majority voted for the inclusion of the Republic of China.³³ Another example was the project of establishing the National Museum (*Museum Sejarah Monumen Nasional*, Museum Monas) with dioramas representing Indonesian history and identity. In Sukarno's planning, one diorama was dedicated to the First GANEFO featuring himself and Maladi as well as the slogans of the Games 'Onward! No Retreat!' and 'Build the World anew'. With a continuation of the Guided Democracy, GANEFO would not just have entered the Museum Monas, but also national history. The snapshot of the Games had the intention

of demonstrating Indonesia's return to greatness and the nation's role in world history. Yet, General Suharto's power seizure prevented Sukarno's concept of the museum from realization. Instead, Suharto's new museum committee revised the concept and changed and omitted certain dioramas. Among others, the scene of the GANEFO was excluded and thus prevented from entering national memory. Other events, which supported the New Order vision of the past and provided legitimacy to the regime, replaced GANEFO and Sukarno's struggle for national unity and greatness, as well as national advancement towards socialism.³⁴

Hence, only after the fall of Suharto, the rehabilitation of Sukarno beyond his role as the father of independence entailed a new perspective of the Fourth Asian Games, as well as GANEFO. Both sporting events receive an increased appreciation, especially in the current preparation period of the 18th Asian Games. The legacy of GANEFO is therefore linked to the perception of Sukarno, who is officially proclaimed a 'national hero' and enjoys an increased popularity since the democratization process in Indonesia. References to GANEFO, therefore, occur in the context of acknowledging Sukarno and his striving for national unity.³⁵

The change of government, starting in 1965, entailed a realignment of the Indonesian sport organizations. As early as December 1965, DORI (Sports Council of the Republic of Indonesia) was officially 'freed' from political influence and renamed Indonesian Sports Council (*Komite Olahraga Nasional Indonesia*, KONI). In 1967, President Suharto confirmed KONI as a non-governmental and autonomous body with the mission to help the government in the sports sector, but to remain outside of politics. The presidential decree thus established that KONI should not be controlled by any power elite, but rather be returned to Indonesian society. The new body simplified the structure of the sports sector in Indonesia. The responsibilities of the Sports Council concentrated on Indonesian elite sport and the representation at the IOC and AGF including the planning of preparations of the Indonesian athletes for international sporting events.³⁶ The head of the 'new' KONI was Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, the Sultan of Yogyakarta and the second Indonesian vice-president (1973–1978). He functioned as the Indonesian member of the IOC between 1967 and 1972. The Sultan's involvement in sporting organizations occurred at a time when the position as vice-president left him only ceremonial power. He continued his activities in the sports sector after resigning from the office as vice-president.³⁷

Suharto's foreign policy aimed to end Indonesia's isolation from the Western countries and to re-integrate the country into international organizations such as the IOC. The reconsolidation with the IOC included Indonesia's participation at the Fifth Asian Games in Bangkok in 1966, at the 1967 Universiade in Tokyo and, most importantly, at the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico. In October 1968, Indonesia was officially reinstated into the IOC with Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX as Indonesia's representative. Furthermore, the new guidelines for sports in Indonesia concentrated on the benefit for body and soul for sportspersons and on the aspect of competitiveness for international events. In accordance with *pancasila*, Indonesia's state ideology, the sports institutions and activities were continuously depoliticized.³⁸

Suharto's domestic policy focused on the economic development of the country with *pembangunan* (development) as the central parameter of success. Therefore, the new formation of the sports sector followed a so-called 'scientific approach' with the target being effective, objective and reliable in order to support Indonesia's development.³⁹ The

foreign policy emphasized the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, especially the ASEAN countries. Indonesia as the biggest country in the ASEAN region had a strong interest in a leading position among its neighbouring countries. In this strategy, one promising soft power tool had been neglected in the early years of the *Orde Baru* (New Order) government, namely sport and the hosting of sporting events. The country was not part of the major multi-sport event in the region, which had regularly taken place since 1959. In 1958, during the Third Asian Games in Tokyo, representatives of Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaya and South Vietnam founded the Southeast Asian Peninsular Games Federation. The Southeast Asian Peninsular (SEAP) Games followed the concept and idea of the Asian and Olympic Games and were thus situated under the supervision of the IOC. Besides devoting itself to the Olympic ideals of friendship and sportsmanship, the main target of the SEAP Games was regional solidarity. The means to reach this goal was to link sport as a popular activity with diplomacy and cultural programmes.⁴⁰ Under Thailand's leadership, the Games developed into a regular event, taking place every two years in a changing host country. The decision to hold the Games in the years between the two major sporting events, the Olympic and the Asian Games, reflected the intention to provide a platform to prepare for the big and prestigious events and to raise the competitiveness of the South-East Asian athletes. The similar sporting level was perceived as a promising condition to improve the skills of the athletes, who were often behind in international competitions.⁴¹ Political changes within the region led to adaptations within the SEAP Games Federation, for example concerning the Confederation of Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.

Between 1958 and 1977, Indonesia had no link with the sporting event in the neighbouring countries. Not only had the regional focus on mainland South-East Asia kept Indonesia from the SEAP Games; it also excluded Sukarno's politics in the 1950s and 1960s. His flirt with communism stood in contrast to the anti-communist agenda of the Federation.⁴² A change of paradigm occurred in 1975 when, finally, the SEAP Games Federation decided to expand its regional scope by including the countries of insular South-East Asia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines. The official admission of the three countries into the Federation



Figure 1. Flag of the Southeast Asian Peninsular Games. Source: https://rankly.com/cache/236919c1104589cf6ba17555363aa599_w500_h500.jpg

occurred in 1979. Consequently, the name of the games had to be adapted to the new situation. The pragmatic solution earmarked the omission of the word 'Peninsular', and the new name Southeast Asian Games, which is currently still in use, was coined. The main force behind the new orientation of the SEAP Games was Malaysia. After perceiving difficulties to nominate a host for the 1979 Games, Malaysia suggested to expand the SEA Games and to invite Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei.⁴³ In spite of the extension, the Federation emphasized the continuity of this regional sporting event and decided to keep the numeration of the Games with the 1959 SEAP Games in Bangkok as the first. The 1979 SEA Games in Jakarta thus went down in history as the 10th Southeast Asian Games.⁴⁴ The logo kept its design and only additional rings were added to symbolize the new members (Figure 1). The new Charter issued in 1978 stressed the conformity to the Olympic ideals, for instance, with the stated aim to 'spread the Olympic principles throughout South East Asia thereby creating goodwill in the region'.⁴⁵

In contrast to Malaysia, the main force from within the SEAP Games Federation to support the expansion of the Games, Thailand's attitude towards the newcomers was not so welcoming. In the early 1970s, Thailand was still able to prevent the expansion. Since Thailand held a dominant position in the Federation as the initiator of the regional event, it did not have an interest in integrating other regional heavyweights such as Indonesia. The SEAP Games were a Thai brainchild and thus connected to the ideas and intentions of this country. Furthermore, Thailand hosted the Games three times between 1959 and 1975 and was very successful in sporting terms during these early years. Consequently, the expansion to insular South-East Asia was against Thai policy in the region of peninsular South-East Asia.⁴⁶ In addition, Indonesia had posed a threat to the SEAP Games during the 1960s and had thus already acted willingly against Thailand as the head of this regional event. The 1963 GANEFO, and even more so, the 1966 Asian GANEFO embodied rival events challenging the Peninsular Games with a contrasting ideology. Indonesia's leading role in GANEFO was an argument against the country's integration in the SEAP Games Federation. Nevertheless, the difficulty to find suitable hosts among the participants for the biennial event finally led to the renewal of the SEAP Games.

Indonesia showed a high interest in joining the SEA Games. The country aimed to emphasize an image of capability, as well as cooperation, with the other ASEAN countries. One of the stated targets of the 1979 SEA Games was to 'cultivate and develop the holding of the South East Asia Games as a means in realizing utmost cooperation and solidarity of the South East Asian nations, through these venues of sports'.⁴⁷ One example of good neighbourly relations was the showcased gratefulness towards Malaysia. The complete turnabout from 'Ganyang Malaysia' to thanking Malaysia for providing an example worthy of imitation reflects the entirely different political standpoints of the Sukarno and the Suharto era. The country did not attempt to make a grand entrance as the host of the SEA Games, but followed a script of humbleness and cooperation with the other countries. A manifestation of the cooperation and mutual understanding with an Indonesian flavour was the concept of *gotong royong*. Thus, the SEA Games unintentionally followed the orientation of the GANEFO, which had also upheld the value of mutual help and solidarity. In the context of the SEA Games, *gotong royong* found translation into 'the spirit of national Cooperation',⁴⁸ and thus became a link between Indonesian, respectively Javanese, culture, and the international event. Following this concept, the suggested image of Indonesia was one of a good neighbour who is eager to play an even more active part of the community than before. Although

Indonesia was not a new member of ASEAN, the hosting of the SEA Games provided the possibility to increase its soft power among the South-East Asian countries. The SEA Games, under the umbrella of OCA,⁴⁹ helped Indonesia to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate and to forget the period of confrontation with the IOC and the AGF.

One of the important figures in the preparation of the 10th SEA Games was the already mentioned Sultan of Yogyakarta Hemengku Bowono IX. He was the president of the Organizing Committee and thus jointly responsible for the implementation of the Games. In Indonesia, he is not only well known and respected as a political leader and national hero, but also as a *tokoh olahraga*, a key figure of Indonesian sport.⁵⁰ In the context of hosting the Tenth SEA Games, the Indonesian sports bodies KONI and KOI were combined but had different functions in order to improve the efficiency. The Indonesian Olympic Committee (KOI) was the international branch and the Sports Council (KONI) was the national branch. Both bodies had the same president; a system, which led to a great concentration of power on the highest management level.

From 1979 on, Indonesia remained one of the core countries in the SEA Games Federation, hosting the Games in 1987, 1997 and 2011. Every time Indonesia hosted the SEA Games, the target was to strengthen the country's position as an economic and political stronghold in the region. Especially the latest Games in 2011 aimed to emphasize Indonesia's re-emergence after the turmoil of the democratization and decentralization processes following the fall of President Suharto. The main theme of the Games was the kingdom of Srivijaya, with the slogan 'Srivijaya: The Golden Peninsula'. Srivijaya was one of the last Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms of maritime South-East Asia and exerted influence in the region between 680 and 1400 AD. The centre of the kingdom was in South Sumatra, thus fitting well as the co-host of the Games Palembang, the capital of South Sumatra. The theme evoked positive associations since the kingdom and the concept of the golden peninsula suggested values like peace and tolerance. Srivijaya, for instance, is praised as a peaceful kingdom of trade where people of diverse ethnic backgrounds and even religious affiliations could interact without any barriers.⁵¹ Naturally, the Indonesian leaders were keen to link this image of a prosperous and peaceful polity with the young Indonesian democracy. The theme of the SEA Games was thus supposed to convey a picture of the host country as diverse but united, as tolerant towards all ethnic and religious groups, as powerful and influential but not dominating and suppressing and as a strong economy. As the SEA Games coincided with Indonesia's ASEAN chairmanship, the leaders of the country saw 2011 as the year of the manifestation of Indonesia's re-emergence and positioning as the region's leader. The sporting success of the Indonesian athletes underlined the country's ambition.⁵²

Current Trends of Conflict and Cooperation

Conflict: The Dispute Over the Olympic Rings

After decades of conformity to the Olympic Movement, Indonesia returned to a more confrontational attitude towards the IOC in recent years. Although the issues were of minor importance compared to the escalations in the 1960s, Indonesia was still warned and even threatened with punishment. The starting point for the first confrontation in 2008/2009 was an internal conflict between the Ministry of Youth and Sports Affairs and the KONI. When the Ministry of Youth and Sports Affairs launched a 'Top-Tier Athletes Program' in

2008, this was perceived as an unwelcome government intervention and an intrusion into the territory of the Sports Council. The IOC intervened because it saw a violation against the Olympic Charter, which promotes no government interventions. The unauthorized launching of the programme by the Indonesian Ministry of Youth and Sports Affairs was thus judged as severe enough to call for action. The IOC, as well as the OCA, issued a warning that KONI's international membership might be suspended and Indonesia banned from international competitions.⁵³

Although this first incident did not have far-reaching consequences, as Indonesia was able to avoid a suspension, some years later another clash between the IOC and the Indonesian sport committees made the headlines even beyond those of the Indonesian press. The confrontation in 2015 had its background in another internal conflict between the two main sports bodies in Indonesia: the Indonesian Sports Council (*Komite Olahraga Nasional (Indonesia)*, KON or KONI) and the Indonesian Olympic Committee (*Komite Olimpiade Indonesia*, KOI). In general, the separation of tasks is clear: the main task of the Sports Council is to organize sports development projects within the country, including the organization of the National Games, whilst the Indonesian Olympic Committee is responsible for the international relations with the IOC and other world governing bodies. Thus, the letter is nominally responsible for the preparation for international events such as the Olympic, Asian and Southeast Asian Games. Nevertheless, the source of conflict was the question of responsibility of preparing the Indonesian sports teams for these international multisport events. The dispute was in part a legacy of the new formation of the committees in 2005. Although the organizations KONI and KOI had already long existed, in 2005, a new law reorganized the Indonesian landscape of sports committees trying to put an end to the unclear and changing responsibilities of the preceding decades. Hence, the separation of tasks between KON and KOI as mentioned above was established. Yet, already in 2007, further changes occurred and the acronym KON returned to KONI, followed by further arrangements, which again shrouded the distribution of responsibilities.⁵⁴

In accordance with the general separation of responsibilities, the IOC interacted with KOI as the representative of the country. This included certain rights and obligations shared by all member committees of the IOC. One aspect is that only national Olympic committees, which the IOC has officially accepted, are allowed to use the iconic Olympic logo featuring the five different coloured interlaced rings. Any other organization or individual adopting this logo without permission violates the property rights of the IOC. In 2014, KONI integrated the Olympic rings into its own logo, claiming to have the right to do so as the Indonesian representative at the Olympic Committee. This claim led to a conflict not only with the Indonesians, but even with the IOC. The quarrel even threatened Indonesia's right to host the 2018 Asian Games.⁵⁵

The logo itself, with the red flame in the centre and the yellow wings linked with three red interlocking rings, has a long history as the official logo of the Indonesian Sports Council. Yet, only recently did KONI see itself as entitled to add the Olympic rings at the head of the logo. The Indonesian Olympic Committee gave the Olympic rings a very prominent position in the centre of the logo just below the Indonesian flag, thus emphasizing its own claim on the Olympic Movement (Figure 2). The struggle between KONI and KOI led to the stalemate that both bodies attempted to monopolize the copyright of the five rings and thus the status as the official member of the IOC. The Olympic rings thus became the symbol of the rightful National Olympic Committee (NOC) of Indonesia. KONI's argument was that



Figure 2. Logo of the Indonesian Sports Council with the Olympic rings. Source: http://static.republika.co.id/uploads/images/inpicture_slide/logo-koni-pusat-_150206164629-530.png



Figure 3. Logo of the Indonesian Olympic Committee. Source: <http://sp.beritasatu.com/media/images/original/20,151,001,163,537,886.jpg>

it has the longer history (since 1978) as the official NOC; KOI's perspective, in contrast, underlined the current separation of tasks giving the realm of international activities to KOI (Figure 3). The position as the official Indonesian NOC promised a higher degree of power and influence not only for the institution, but also for the powerholders within the committees. The subliminal power struggle between KONI and KOI had accompanied the diverse changes of laws and arrangements concerning the two bodies since 2005. The moment of escalation in 2015 can be linked to the awarding of the 18th Asian Games to Indonesia – a unique opportunity for the Indonesian sports bodies to gain attention, power and large funds. Both committees thus perceived the event as a chance to improve their positions especially in direct comparison with the 'opponent' committee.

Following the concept of Aspinall (2013), the Asian Games embody a huge *proyek* (project) combining neoliberal economic policies with clientelism.⁵⁶ Aspinall shows that 'project hunting' penetrates every sphere of the Indonesian social and political life, ranging from political parties to nongovernmental organizations to religious groups. Sporting events are a prime example of a *proyek* as they promise a relatively large slice of patronage resources. A major event such as the Asian Games generates a considerable budget for diverse kinds of investments, yet it also offers niches for money to disappear into clientist networks and private channels. Hence, leaders of KONI and KOI compete over the *proyek* Asian Games as well as the small projects related to the international event, its preparation and implementation.

The tension due to the conflict increased in early 2015 when the IOC issued its warning regarding the unauthorized use of the Olympic rings. The IOC called upon the Indonesian government to solve the problem and defend the interest of the Olympic Committee, reinforcing the demand by threatening to withdraw the award of the upcoming Asian Games. It was a strong message of discontent when Thomas Bach, as the head of the IOC, and Sheikh Ahmad Al Fahad Al Sabah, as the president of the OCA, addressed a letter to the Indonesian President Joko Widodo for a call for action. As a consequence, the government was under pressure to end the conflict between KONI and KOI and to satisfy the IOC. The most promising method to make the Sports Council compliant was to cut the funding. Presumably, this threat depicted the main reason for the Sports Council to finally comply with the demand and to change the logo. The following messages issued by the Indonesian government and representatives of the Indonesian Sports Council eagerly stressed the wish of cooperation and the common striving for a successful preparation and implementation of the Asian Games.⁵⁷

When the IOC threatened Indonesia with heavy penalties, the South-East Asian country had to fear losing the hosting award of the 18th Asian Games. This event is a milestone in Indonesia's history of hosting sporting events and, therefore, the threat was very serious. Consequently, the Indonesian government had to react and to demonstrate its conformity with the demands of the IOC. Although the dispute began as an internal power struggle between the Indonesian sports bodies, the involvement of the IOC changed it into an international affair. The non-conformity and arbitrary action of the Indonesian Sports Council endangered cooperation with the IOC and thus with the OCA as well. The IOC, as the patron institution of the Asian Games, had the upper hand in the conflict with Indonesia, demonstrating its power by exerting pressure on the Indonesian government. The supra-national character and the lack of competing institutions make the IOC a very potent body that is able to threaten and penalize not only NOCs, but even national governments.

Indonesia, which had once resisted the IOC and had borne the consequences, had a weak stand in this dispute. The country depended on the IOC and OCA to implement the 2018 Asian Games. In the year 2015, however, there was no political clash of ideologies comparable to the 1960s. Indonesia's fundamental attitude towards the IOC was not confrontational but rather conforming.

Cooperation: The XVIII Asian Games

In the last decade, Indonesia has shown an increased interest in hosting sporting events. After the consolidation of the young democracy, political leaders rediscovered sporting events as a promising tool for domestic and foreign policy. By hosting the 2008 inaugural Asian Beach Games, the 2011 Southeast Asian Games, the 2013 Islamic Solidarity Games and the 2014 ASEAN University Games, Indonesia entered the 'event circuit' following other emerging economies. The peak of the efforts is the prospect of hosting the 18th Asian Games in 2018. In comparison with 'normal' bidding processes for international sporting events, the path leading to Indonesia's awarding of the Games was rather intricate. Consequently, there were also more interactions between Indonesia and the OCA in the process.

The bidding process began in March 2010 when potential candidates handed in their proposals. In 2012, only two candidates remained; namely Hanoi, Vietnam, and Surabaya, Indonesia. Hanoi won the bid and was awarded the 2019 Asian Games. Vietnam's success was accompanied by the decision to change the rhythm of the Games from the even to the uneven years between the Summer and Winter Olympics. Surprisingly, Vietnam withdrew in April 2014 and a new host had to be found. The only serious candidate was Indonesia; in contrast to the original bid, however, the potential host city was not Surabaya but Jakarta with one or several co-hosts as supporters. During the 2014 Asian Games in Incheon, Indonesian representatives signed the contract to become the new host of the 18th Asian Games.

The pressure on the OCA to find a new host put it into a rather weak position in negotiations, whereas Indonesia's position was strong in contrast due to the lack of competitors. Consequently, Indonesia was able to negotiate the return to the four years interval and to implement the Asian Games in 2018. Indonesia could thus enforce national interests over the OCA's planning. The reason to prefer 2018 was to avoid a collision with the presidential elections in Indonesia in 2019. Furthermore, due to the unusual situation and the limited time, the process of the 'second bid' did not follow the normal rules of the OCA. Indonesia, as the host country, was already confirmed before having a final decision on the host city or cities. Hence, the competition between the cities, which usually occurs prior to the official bidding process, now came last. The result is a novelty in the history of the Asian Games, as for the first time, there will be two official host cities for the Games, namely Jakarta and Palembang, the provincial capital of South Sumatra. Again, the Indonesian – in this case Palembang's – interest overruled the concept of the OCA.

After both cities were officially acknowledged and incorporated into the logo, the negotiations over the distribution of the specific events began (Figure 4). Representatives of the OCA, Jakarta and Palembang had to decide about the venue of the opening and closing ceremonies, as well as the venues of the 38 sports and disciplines. The OCA preferred to have as many events as possible in the Indonesian capital, reducing the logistic challenges entailed in the concept of two host cities on different islands. In the Council's point of view,



Figure 4. Logo of the XVIII Asian Games. Source: http://static.republika.co.id/uploads/images/inpicture_slide/logo-baru-asian-games-2018-_160728140344-630.jpg

Palembang's infrastructure and facilities do not meet the international requirements or will not be ready in time. Following the news coverage on these debates reveals contrasting positions and tough negotiations. One controversial issue is the host for the opening and closing ceremonies; events with very high prestige and external impact. Palembang is very eager to host at least one of these ceremonies and Jakarta agrees to share the task and to organize only the opening ceremony. The OCA, in opposition, demands to have both ceremonies in Jakarta. Officially, the agreement to have two co-hosts for the Asian Games is based on the condition to follow the Council's guideline. Yet both Indonesian parties strongly supported Palembang's endeavours. Even Jakarta's Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama gives preference to the South Sumatran capital. Consequently, the OCA is under pressure and might submit to the Indonesian concept.

Nevertheless, not only does the OCA feel the pressure. Indonesia has very limited time for the preparation facing many obstacles with regard to the infrastructure and also for the preparation of the athletes. On the one hand, the building project of the athletes' village in Jakarta, the infrastructure projects such as the monorail and the upgrade of some venues need resources and good planning strategies. On the other hand, in sporting terms, Indonesia has not performed well during the last Asian and Southeast Asian Games. The target to have a strong performance similar to the one in 1962 when Indonesia hosted the Asian Games, coming in second in the medal tally is very ambitious and needs a new orientation as well as an organization of the entire sporting sector in Indonesia.

Conclusion

GANEFO put Indonesia on centre stage in a conflict with the IOC. The South-East Asian country aimed to position itself as the leader of the decolonizing world, challenging the Old Established Order, including the IOC. The charismatic leader President Sukarno used the Games to enforce his ambition in the Third Worldist policy and to challenge the monopolist in the international sporting sector. The IOC, in reaction, put pressure on the Third World countries by threatening them with exclusion, thus enhancing the confrontation. Hence,

the alternative sporting event imposed a serious threat to the IOC, yet the struggle for supremacy was short lived. Even in the core country of GANEFO, the event did not generate a long-lasting legacy. The political turnover and President Suharto's extreme anti-communist policy erased the sporting event from the Indonesian memory. The new government tried to heal the rift with the IOC by approaching the Western, capitalist countries, reorganizing the sports institutions in the country and joining the regional Southeast Asian Games under the umbrella of the IOC. Playing an important role in the anti-communist orientated SEA Games emphasized the conformity to the concepts of the international sports bodies IOC and AGF, respectively OCA.

After a long time of conformity, Indonesia found itself in a dispute with the IOC. Whilst the conflict over the use of the Olympic rings was originally an internal struggle about power structures and a fight for a large profit of the 'proyek Asian Games', the involvement of the IOC changed it into an international affair with two unequal opponents. The IOC had the power to exert pressure on the Indonesian government to enforce its demand. During the negotiations and preparations for the 18th Asian Games, in contrast, Indonesia held a rather strong position towards the OCA. Yet, the limited time for the preparation put the host cities, as well as the Council, under pressure. The 2018 Asian Games, therefore, depict a great opportunity for Indonesia to demonstrate its ability as a host and its conformity with the Olympic principles on the one hand; yet, on the other hand, the event is also a big challenge and failures could lead to further tensions with the IOC or the OCA.

Notes

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13. Adams, "'Pancasila': Sport and the Building of Indonesia", 309; Direktorat Jenderal Olah Raga, *Sejarah Olahraga Indonesia* (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan Nasional 2003), 57–8.
14. Lutan and Hong, 'The Politicization of Sport', 23; Hübner, 'The Fourth Asian Games', 1305f.
15. Direktorat Jenderal Olah Raga, *Sejarah*, 80.
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Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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